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BOOK REVIEW
WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS
AND OLIVE BRANCH? By W. Taylor Reveley III. University of Virginia
Press, Charlottesville, Va., 1981, pp. ix, 394, $15.95.
Reviewed by William B. Spong, Jr.*
Periodically in American history, bold international moves by a strong
President or prolonged involvement in an unpopular war have prompted
national debate over the respective war powers of Congress and the Presi-
dent. America's failure to terminate successfully the war in Indochina
triggered the most intense of the war powers debates.' After numerous
efforts to ensure a congressional voice in decisions to commit American
troops into hostile situations overseas, Congress passed the War Powers
Resolution of 19732 and enacted it into law over a presidential veto. Made
possible by the political fallout surrounding the Vietnam and Watergate
controversies, the Resolution sought to provide a procedural framework
within which the nation would exercise its war powers. Unfortunately,
many consider the final product essentially ambiguous, rendering it little
more than an unloved stepchild to the already laconic war powers provi-
sions contained in our Constitution.
Eighteen years after passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and nearly
* Dean and Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of
William and Mary. The reviewer, a United States Senator from Virginia from 1967 to 1973,
participated as floor manager during the 1972 Senate debates on the War Powers
Resolution.
I Another series of debates challenging the constitutional war powers of the President
took place in reaction to pre-Pearl Harbor actions taken by President Franklin Roosevelt in
1940, when he unilaterally exchanged destroyers for bases with Great Britain, and in 1941,
when he sent American troops to Greenland and Iceland and provided armed convoys for
shipping supplies to Britain.
Roosevelt's actions provided precedents for President Truman to send armed forces to
Korea in 1950 without congressional authorization or consultation. In 1951, President Tru-
man sent four additional divisions to Europe as a deterrent to Russian aggression. Both
actions prompted prolonged debate in the Senate, led by Senator Robert A. Taft. Taft ques-
tioned, on constitutional grounds, the sending of troops to Korea and Europe, as he had
done a decade earlier when Roosevelt sent troops to Iceland.
' Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980)).
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a decade since the evacuation of Saigon, Taylor Reveley, in a thoughtful,
often incisive work, has made a significant contribution to the body of
scholarly literature concerning constitutional war powers. Reveley's book
is more than an historical or legal summary. His searching analysis
reevaluates the War Powers Resolution itself and recommends an alloca-
tion of constitutional warmaking powers that "involves less control for
Congress than the Constitutional Fathers expected, but also less control
for the President than most Executives in this century and a number
before have actually exercised."'
Reveley is no newcomer among those who ponder the war powers.4 He
has long realized that "argument over the allocation of war powers con-
jures up two of our most cherished political bugbears: the fear that Amer-
ican democracy will perish, choked by presidential tyranny, and the
obverse dread that it will smother amid congressional indecision and pa-
rochialism."'5 Mindful of such divergent fears, Reveley examines the text
of the Constitution's war powers provisions, the purposes of the framers
and ratifiers, evolving beliefs about what the Constitution requires, and
the various allocations of control over war powers that have emerged in
actual practice. Reveley pays proper respect to the text of the Constitu-
tion, but goes beyond its literal language by delving into the relatively
unexplored oral and written debates among the framers and at the
1787-88 ratifying conventions. His exhaustive review of those early years
leads Reveley to conclude that the framers and ratifiers intended Con-
gress, not the President, to have the preeminent role in warmaking.
Nearly two hundred years of historical precedent show, however, that the
founding fathers' intent has not often been realized.
In the years since ratification, the nation has seen a rising presidential
sway over basic decisions involving war and peace. A graph charting this
rise would show an uneven but cumulative progression toward presiden-
tial hegemony, reaching local peaks under the administrations of Lincoln,
Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, and finally
Johnson and Nixon. Strong presidents have taken advantage of textual
uncertainties in the Constitution and thus, through usage, have contrib-
uted to an evolving view of executive power and the role of the Com-
mander-in-Chief that is today quite expansive.
The retreat before executive hegemony has not been steady. As Reveley
notes, "there have been many instances in which the legislators have con-
' W. Reveley, War Powers of the President and Congress: Who Holds the Arrows and
Olive Branch? 204 (1981).
" See Reveley, Constitutional Allocation of the War Powers Between the President and
Congress: 1787-1788, 15 Va. J. Int'l L. 73 (1974); Reveley, Presidential War-making: Consti-
tutional Prerogative or Usurpation?, 55 Va. L. Rev. 1243 (1969).
5 W. Reveley, supra note 3, at 8.
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trolled American policy or participated as the President's equal in shap-
ing it."6 For the most part, however, Congress has accepted presidential
policy and acquiesced in presidential initiatives. Reveley nonetheless ob-
serves an ever-present capacity in Congress to rebound from such bouts
of relative impotence. This resilience is seen most dramatically when
Congress splits with the President over basic issues of foreign policy and
cries of executive usurpation rise from the floors of the House and Sen-
ate. Once the current crisis has passed, however, Congress has tradition-
ally retired to await the next controversy without establishing lasting
mechanisms through which it might exercise an active, rather than a
merely reactive, voice in the nation's warmaking decisions. In general, the
decibel level of congressional protest over nonparticipation in use-of-force
decisions has been in inverse relation to the success of the particular mili-
tary initiative under challenge.
Reveley's work does not make light reading. In the midst of his careful,
multi-factored analysis, all but the most serious scholar will yearn for an
occasional anecdote about a founding father, a president, or a congress-
man to demonstrate the human factors that have so often played a part
in the nation's decisions to seek war or peace. Reveley, a practicing attor-
ney, is true to his brief, however, and refuses to divert his reader with
levity. His analysis moves purposefully forward with close attention to
those factors that most economically develop his thesis.
The key to Reveley's reasoning is found in the discussion in which he
outlines the long-term ends sought by the constitutional fathers as they
divided authority over war and peace. These ends included promoting the
national defense, hindering the use of military force for domestic tyranny,
obtaining democratic control over policy, permitting prompt emergency
action, and ensuring an American capacity to move toward war or peace
rapidly and in secrecy whenever necessary.7 The incompatibility among
these goals is evident; democratic control, for example, cannot simultane-
ously be given equal weight with speed and secrecy.
Reveley considers that some of these ends are executive prerogatives,
while others are legislative. Generally, executive ends-such as the need
for emergency action-permit the President to be favored in the initial
stages of use-of-force decisions. Legislative ends-such as ensuring demo-
cratic control over policy-come into play at later stages in a crisis when
the need for national consensus on basic decisions of war and peace be-
comes paramount. His analysis thus grants the President more freedom
of action than the framers and ratifiers probably intended, yet gives Con-
gress an important counterbalancing role as well. Reveley believes that
Id. at 121 (emphasis in original).
' Id. at 72, 175-81.
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such a balance is consistent with the important ends sought by the fram-
ers and ratifiers. Only by staggering executive and legislative prerogatives
over time can they be harmonized among themselves and made to work in
the real world.
After reviewing Reveley's suggested division of constitutional war pow-
ers, one must ask whether it complements or undercuts the provisions of
the War Powers Resolution of 1973. Reveley's own conclusion is that the
Resolution, though flawed, does give Congress the potential to play a sub-
stantial role in basic decisions of war and peace; this role is consistent
with his belief that the executive and legislative branches share respon-
siblity for this area of constitutional activity. Briefly stated, the Resolu-
tion permits the President to act in emergency military situations without
prior congressional approval. Under certain circumstances, the President
is required to consult with the Congress. Whenever the President in-
troduces troops into situations where hostilities are imminent or already
under way, or into foreign territory while equipped for combat, or as rein-
forcements in substantial numbers, he must submit a report to Congress
within forty-eight hours. If the President submits the report because he
has introduced troops into a combat situation, then a period of sixty days
begins to run. During that period, Congress has several options. It may
either direct the President to end hostilities by passing a concurrent reso-
lution within sixty days, declare war, or authorize continued hostilities. If
Congress takes no action and the sixty-day period expires, however, then
hostilities must cease and the troops must be withdrawn.
During the Senate debates, supporters of the Resolution in its final
form hailed it as an historic recapture of congressional authority,$ while
others in Congress criticized it as an historic surrender to executive
power.' Louis Henkin viewed the Resolution as "important only as a
promise for new attitudes for the future."'1 Reveley is a bit more bullish,
stating that the Resolution's enactment was a necessary initial thrust to
arrest the gravitational pull toward executive hegemony in American
warmaking."1 He observes, however, that Congress has done little since
enactment to sustain this thrust, and cites as evidence Congress' failure
to implement the terms for evacuating American troops from Vietnam,
even though President Ford had specifically requested congressional gui-
dance on this point."' Reveley points to further examples of congressional
passivity that occurred in the wake of President Nixon's failure to report
' See, e.g., 119 Cong. Rec. 36,189 (1973) (statement of Sen. Javits).
' See, e.g., id. (statement of Sen. Eagleton).
10 Henkin, "A More Effective System" for Foreign Relations: The Constitutional Frame-
work, 61 Va. L. Rev. 751, 774 (1975).
1, W. Reveley, supra note 3, at 261.
12 Id. at 249-53.
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during the 1974 Cyprus crisis and President Ford's and Carter's inade-
quate reports and lack of prior consultation during the various crises in
their administrations.'3
Reveley is at his best when examining the Resolution, dispassionately
probing its weaknesses with the skill of a surgeon. While he finds consti-
tutional support for war powers legislation, he questions the value of
some of the Resolution's specific provisions. He observes, for example,
that despite congressional concern over prior consultation, the Resolution
actually requires consultation only if the President intends to introduce
troops into hostilities or situations in which hostile engagement is immi-
nent. The mere deployment of troops, even if equipped for combat, is
thus not covered under the Resolution's consultations section. Nor does
the report which the President must file with Congress following the in-
troduction of American troops overseas trigger the sixty-day period for
congressional approval, unless hostilities exist or appear likely. The result
has been that, under the Resolution, presidents have consulted and re-
ported as they have seen fit; compliance has been, at best, restrained.
President Nixon's veto message took particular exception to those pro-
visions of the Resolution that would terminate the President's use of mili-
tary forces whenever Congress took no action within the sixty-day period
or directed withdrawal by concurrent resolution. Reveley agrees that the
Constitution does not empower Congress to halt an ongoing executive ini-
tiative by mere inaction,'4 and he sees no good purpose served by the
sixty-day limit. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that Congress could withstand
the pressure generated by its failure to act or that those opposing the
intervention would restrict themselves to mere inactivity, if little or no
genuine support existed for the President's action. Nor is it likely that a
President, as Commander-in-Chief, would or could allow hostilities to be
terminated if military forces were still engaged. Nevertheless, the Resolu-
tion does require such termination and thus provides critics with reason
to question its underlying soundness and constitutionality. Reveley does
regard as sound, however, the provision that Congress may end presiden-
tial initiatives by adopting a veto-proof concurrent resolution.'5
Although he criticizes the Resolution's flaws and Congress' unwilling-
ness to enforce the procedures spelled out in it, Reveley emphasizes that
the legislation retains "potent bite." He believes that Presidents will con-
tinue to report under the Resolution and that consultation, though hur-
ried, will occur.' 6 Under his view, the framers and ratifiers intended Con-
:3 Id. at 248-49, 253-54, 259-61.
4 Id. at 191-92.
15 Id. at 197-98, 236.
16 President Reagan's actions to date suggest that he intends to follow the pattern of
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gress to play a substantial role in warmaking decisions, but that role has
diminished in the face of rising presidential dominance brought on by
changing times, strong presidents, and congressional acquiescence.
Reveley believes in the underlying wisdom of the ends sought by the
framers and ratifiers, and that those purposes are just as responsive to
national needs today as they were in the early days of our republic. If
arranged in staggered priority over time, these purposes offer the best
hope for constitutional compliance and national consensus. Under
Reveley's analysis, the War Powers Resolution, despite its defects, could
be a practical vehicle for institutionalizing the framers' and ratifiers' pur-
poses, provided that its consultation and reporting sections are properly
implemented.
Reveley also finds the War Powers Resolution preferable to any of the
other alternatives available to Congress. Congress enacted the Resolution
as an alternative to using its power of the purse to control military adven-
tures by the executive. Reveley dismisses this latter option as unwork-
able, noting that "[c]utting off funds is a drastic remedy not easily
adopted even in extreme circumstances and one rarely conducive to thor-
ough debate about policy.117
Leading opponents of the Resolution have also championed a constitu-
tional amendment as the best method for dividing warmaking powers.18
Reveley observes, however, that a war powers amendment would lack
ready political appeal. Moreover, it would be unwise to attempt formal
amendment even if adoption were a realistic possibility. In his words,
"the new, detailed prose of a thorough job would measurably tarnish the
earlier administrations in regard to the Resolution's requirements. That pattern has in-
volved a failure to report at all in some circumstances or the filing of reports indicating that
no hostilities are imminent in other circumstances. This latter ploy allows the President to
avoid the consultation requirement and the running of the 60-day period under § 4(a)(1) of
the Resolution.
President Reagan made no report to Congress when the supply of arms and advisors for
El Salvador was increased. See Subcomm. on Int'l Sec. and Scientific Affairs of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., The War Powers Resolution: Relevant Doc-
uments, Correspondence, Reports 50-54 (Comm. Print 1981). He did report to Congress on
March 19, 1982, when U.S. forces entered the Sinai as part of a multinational peacekeeping
force. However, the report emphasized that "[n]o hostilities are occurring in the area and we
have no expectation of hostilities." Communication from the President of the United States,
Participation of the United States in the MFO Force Deployed in the Sinai, H.R. Doc. No.
158, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982). Similar reports have been filed more recently in relation
to the introduction of Marines into Lebanon during August and September 1982. See
Zablocki, Reagan Is Skirting the War Powers Act, Washington Post, Oct. 3, 1982, at B7, col.
2. See also Washington Post, Aug. 26, 1982, at A25, col. 1.
17 W. Reveley, supra note 3, at 226-27.
18 See, e.g., 121 Cong. Rec. 13,557 (1975) (statement of Sen. Goldwater).
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Constitution as a symbol of national continuity. 1 9
Finally, Reveley finds judicial review an unlikely solution to the divi-
sion of constitutional war powers. He bases this finding on the courts'
traditional reluctance to intervene in disputes between Congress and the
President. He notes that "[t]he real obstacle has been the tendency of
lower federal courts to find war-power questions political and the Su-
preme Court's refusal to hear such cases, relying on its discretionary juris-
diction. ' 20 Reveley examines the political question doctrine and concludes
that, although caution is suggested, the criteria traditionally applied by
the courts under the doctrine do not compel absolute avoidance.2
Reveley, in fact, urges the Supreme Court to take a case in order to fulfill
its traditional duty to "say what the law is."'22
As a practical matter, then, political activity is more likely to restrain
presidential warmaking than either constitutional amendment or judicial
opinion. Although Reveley supports congressional prerogatives in war-
powers decisionmaking, he has little patience for Congress' inability to
exercise its prerogatives effectively. Nevertheless, it is to Congress that
Reveley ultimately turns as the last hope for reversing the current presi-
dential primacy over war- and peace-making.2 3
Alexander Bickel once observed that the way for Congress to resume
control over American foreign policy is to resume.24 Reveley outlines the
affirmative steps he believes are necessary for a return to constitutional
balance but not to congressional control. Advocates of presidential power
argue, however, that the structure of Congress is inherently too diffuse to
permit that body's effective participation in modern warmaking decisions,
that the President has difficulty in determining with whom in Congress
to consult, and that the fiefdoms inherent in the congressional committee
system make it almost impossible to involve Congress deeply in any crisis
management situation.
To meet these objections, Reveley suggests amending the War Powers
Resolution to tighten its reporting and consultation sections. Such a move
would demonstrate a new resolve on the part of Congress to exercise its
proper role in the constitutional war powers scheme. In addition, Reveley
proposes the establishment of a joint committee to include the leadership
11 W. Reveley, supra note 3, at 206.
20 Id. at 353 n.1.
21 Id. at 209.
11 Id. at 217 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974)).
22 Id. at 218.
21 Congress, the President, and the War Powers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l
Sec. Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 48 (1970).
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of the House and Senate.2 5 This committee would serve as the group with
whom the President would consult and to whom he would report under
the provisions of the War Powers Resolution. Such a crisis committee
would solve much of the executive dilemma about consultation and re-
porting. Furthermore, it would meet congressional complaints that it is
the President and not the Congress who now determines with whom he
shall consult. Yet the idea of a joint war-and-peace committee is not
new,26 and such proposals have often broken down because of disagree-
ments over which members and how many would be selected for
membership.2 7
Despite the merit of these proposals, it is. unlikely that Congress will
gather the resolve to enact them in the absence of another prolonged mil-
itary adventure that goes sour. Even the most ardent proponents of the
original Resolution have had difficulty sustaining sufficient interest be-
yond minor protests in recent years to augur well for the prospects of
statutory amendment.2 Reveley suggests, however, that resuscitation of
25 W. Reveley, supra note 3, at 221.
28 See id. at 355 n.20. The most faithful advocate of a joint committee was Senator Hu-
bert Humphrey, who championed the idea with constancy until his death. See, e.g., Congress
and Foreign Policy: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Investigations of the House
Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 169-72 (1976). In 1975, the Murphy
Commission proposed a Joint Committee on National Security in its final report. See Com-
mission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy 17, 207-10
(1975). The suggestion was scathingly dismissed in the appended comments of Senator Mike
Mansfield, then Senate Majority Leader. See id. at 230-31.
Congressman Clement Zablocki, Chairman of the House Committee on International Re-
lations and a member of the Murphy Commission, tried unsuccessfully to have a Joint Com-
mittee on National Security created. Chairman Zablocki has been the most persistent of the
original war powers sponsors in insisting on prior presidential consultation. See, e.g., Sub-
comm. on Int'l Sec. and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., The War Powers Resolution: Relevant Documents, Correspondence, Re-
ports 50 (Comm. Print 1981).
2 In 1977, a subcommittee of the House Committee on International Relations dismissed
a similar proposal:
A joint committee, composed of the leadership of Congress and the senior members
of the several committees concerned generally with foreign policy would be both un-
wieldly in size and too demanding on those who would compose its membership. It
would also be incapable of solving some of the major impediments to effective con-
gressional participation in foreign policy, such as the lack of meaningful, prior consul-
tation, attitudinal constraints, and disparate and overlapping committee jurisdictions.
Staff of Special Subcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm. on International Rela-
tions, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Congress and Foreign Policy 21 (Comm. Print 1977).
28 See W. Reveley, supra note 3, at 249, 256-61, 367 n.69. For an excellent chronological
review of compliance patterns under the War Powers Resolution that covers American mili-
tary involvement during withdrawal from Indochina, the Mayaguez incident, the 1976 Leba-
non crisis, the Korean tree-cutting incident, the Zaire airlift, the Iranian hostage rescue at-
tempt, and recent events in El Salvador, see J. Sullivan, The War Powers Resolution: A
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congressional prerogatives in this area might well begin, even short of ac-
tual statutory amendment. Such a strategy would require vigilant over-
sight and continuing, early demands for participation whenever the po-
tential for American military involvement overseas arises. There are signs
that some members recognize this need.2 9
Even if some of Reveley's proposals are unlikely to reach fruition, his
book offers fresh insights into the decades-old debate on the proper con-
stitutional division of war powers. Much of this insight stems from the
author's perspective as a detached observer of American constitutional
and military history. Reveley is neither a Senator Javits expounding on
legislative success nor a Senator Eagleton bemoaning the pitfalls of legis-
lative failure. Nor is he a blind advocate stretching to sustain some
preconceived notion of how war powers should be allocated through selec-
tive citations of historical incident and legal precedent.
Many readers will lack the patience to relate Reveley's formulations to
a complex subject. Others may fail to appreciate the admirable work he
has done in dissecting the War Powers Resolution and fitting it into a
suggested system for constitutional warmaking that is essentially consis-
tent with both the founding fathers' underlying purposes and the exigen-
cies of modem warfare. Yet even the casual reader will benefit from the
legal, historical, and logical framework within which Reveley views the
traditional constitutional debate in this area, the War Powers Resolution
itself, and the oft-discarded suggestion for a joint national security com-
mittee of the Congress.
Few neutrals express opinions on the most effective allocation of con-
stitutional war powers. Reveley is a rare exception. Those apostles of con-
gressional prerogative, who believe that history can be rolled back to a
narrow construction of the Constitution despite nearly two hundred years
of custom and usage, will probably disagree with Reveley's suggested pri-
orities favoring presidential prerogatives in emergency situations. Like-
wise, supporters of executive dominance, who fail to appreciate the public
fear of one-person warmaking-a fear rooted in the Constitution-may
look with disfavor on Reveley's middle-of-the-road approach. Yet if mem-
Special Study of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 179-254 (Comm. Print 1982).
29 See, e.g., W. Reveley, supra note 3, at 306-07 (setting forth letter from Senators Javits
and Church to Secretary of State Vance requesting consultations on contemplated usage of
American troops during the then ongoing Iranian hostage crisis). See also S.J. Res. 100, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 Cong. Rec. S11,336-37 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1981) (reaffirming War Powers
Resolution in connection with deployment of U.S. troops as part of multinational
peacekeeping force in the Sinai); 126 Cong. Rec. S9092 (daily ed. July 1, 1980) (statement of
Sen. Exon) (introducing amendment reaffirming the War Powers Resolution in conjunction
with passage of the military procurement bill authorizing funds for a Rapid Deployment
Force).
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hers of Congress believe, as Reveley does, that the founding fathers in-
tended Congress to participate in war- and peace-making decisions, and
that such participation is wise, then there is hope that the membership
will heed the wisdom of Senator Stennis, an early sponsor of the War
Powers Resolution. Speaking in support of a 1980 amendment reaffirming
that Resolution, the Senator admonished his colleagues to keep bright the
plow of congressional prerogative by tilling the soil regularly. Otherwise,
he warned, the plow might fall, rusty and tarnished, into disuse.3 0 Reveley
tells us with compelling logic that it is in the country's long-term interest
to keep that plow bright and shiny, and that both Congress and the Pres-
ident share the arrows and the olive branch.
30 126 Cong. Rec. S9090 (daily ed. July 1, 1980) (statement of Sen. Stennis).
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